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IS IT TIME TO CHANGE THE
ROCKEFELLER DRUG LAWS?
SPIROS A. TSIMBINOS*

I. INTRODUCTION

When the current New York State Penal Law1 went into effect in
1965, the provisions dealing with drug offenses were brief and simple. The penalties for these crimes were moderate sentences, in
keeping with the general philosophy that non-violent crimes should
be treated less severely than those involving violent conduct. 2 In
the late 1960's and early 1970's, however, as our cities became
plagued by the scourge of drug abuse, the public clamored for answers to the problem. In New York State, Governor Rockefeller
and the Legislature responded by enacting the toughest drug laws
in the nation. Commonly known as the Rockefeller Drug Laws,
these statutes 3 provided for mandatory prison terms involving a
* B.A., 1965, City College of New York; J.D., 1968, New York University School of
Law. Mr. Tsimbinos has been a leading appellate practitioner in this State for many years
and has written many articles and has lectured on criminal law and appellate practice. In
1990 and 1991, he served as legal counsel and Chief of Appeals of the Queens County District Attorneys Office. He was elected President of the Queens County Bar Association in
1994 and is presently in private legal practice.
1 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 500.10 (McKinney 1993). Enacted in 1965, it went into effect
in 1967. Id.
2 See Frederick M. Lawrence, The Punishment of Hate: Toward A Normative Theory
of Bias-Motivated Crimes, 93 MICH. L. REV. 320, 352 (1994). The author advances a theory of punishment that would "compare the degrees of badness presupposed on the average by different offenses, and having done that, can lay down the principle that a lesser
offense should not be punished so severely as a greater one." Id.; see also People v. Letterlough, 86 N.Y.2d 259, 265, n.2 (1995). The court noted that when the legislature enacted the New York Penal Law in 1965, it was likely influenced by the premise that individuals could be rehabilitated of their criminal tendencies and that the remedy of
prohibition, intended for less serious offenses, was meant to bring about the rehabilitation. Id.
3 See Joseph W. Bellacosa, Judging Cases v. Courting Public Opinion, 65 FORDA-M L.
REV. 2381, 2397 (1997) (referring to legislation launched in early 1970's, as "Rockefeller
Drug Laws", as an executive solution which included sever restrictions on judicial discretion in sentencing); Paul J. Kellner, Towards A Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?)The
Challenge of the Special Part, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 297, 312 (1998) (indicating mandatory sentences of different levels attached to different degrees of crimes was embodied in
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possible life imprisonment sentence for a large category of drug offenders. 4 As a result, our prison population quickly swelled to new
heights. 5 Over the twenty-five years in which these sentences have
been in effect, questions have been raised about their propriety and
effectiveness and today a new debate is beginning as to whether it
is time to repeal and drastically modify these sentences. Where we
have been, where we are and where we might and should be going
with respect to New York's drug laws is the subject of the instant
article.
A. The Original 1965 Enactments
Under the penal law in effect in 1967, Article 220 divided drug
offenses into two basic categories: possession and sale.6 Each category was then subdivided into degrees depending upon the nature
and quantity of the drugs involved. 7 Four categories were established for possession crimes 8 and three categories were created for
New York's "Rockefeller Drug Laws"); Steven Wisotsky, Exposing the War on Cocaine: The
Futility and Destructiveness of Prohibition, 1983 WIS. L. REv. 1305, 1415 (1983) (concluding that Governor Rockefeller's crusade against drugs reached its pinnacle when he
convinced New York's legislature to adopt nations toughest drug law).
4 See Tracy Huling, Women Drug Couriers:Sentencing Reform Needed for Prisonersof
War, 9 CRIM. JUST. 14, 17 (1994) (noting that Rockefeller Drug Laws contained most severe penalties for drug offenses in nation); see also Joseph A. Bellacosa, Symbols, Slogans,
and Cymbals of CriminalJustice: Where's the Substatnce?, 36 CATH. LAW. 375, 383 (1996)
(commenting how New York Court of Appeals ruling in People v. Thompson "re-trenched
the primacy of the more than twenty year old Rockefeller Drug Law regimen- the sentence had to be fifteen years to life, no judicial exceptions nor discretion allowed"); Paula
C. Johnson, At the Intersection of Injustice: Experiences of African American Women in
Crime and Sentencing, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 39 (1995) (concluding that principle
purposes of 1973 drug law were to scare drug offenders with threat of "get-tough" laws).
5 See Spiros A. Tsimbinos, After Jenna'sLaw, is it Time to modify the Rockefeller Drug
Laws?, N.Y. CRIM. L. NEWS, Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 8 (discussing circumstances around New
York state's increase in prison population from 13,000 to 70,000 since laws were enacted,
without controlling drug trade); see also Bellacosa, supra note 4, at 384 (indicating how
numbers of inmates in New York prisons has catapulted from 12,000 to over 60,000 since
adoption of Rockefeller Drug Laws).
6 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220 (McKinney 1967).
7 See id.
8 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.05 (McKinney 1967) (creating fourth degree A-class misdemeanor for criminal knowing and unlawful possession of dangerous drug); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 220.10 (McKinney 1967) (creating 3rd degree E-class felony for criminal knowing
and unlawful possession of dangerous drug with intent to sell); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.15
(McKinney 1967) (creating 2nd degree D-class felony for criminal knowing and unlawful
possession of dangerous narcotic drug with intent to sell, or consisting of 25 or more cigarettes containing cannabis, or one or more preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances of aggregate weight of 1/8 ounce or more, containing any of the respective alkaloids or salts of heroin, morphine or cocaine, or 1/4 ounce or more, containing any
cannabis, or 1/2 ounce or more, containing raw or prepared opium, or 1/2 ounce or more
containing one or more than one of any of the narcotic drugs); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.20
(McKinney 1967) (creating 1st degree C-class felony for criminal possession of dangerous
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sale. 9 The sentence penalties ranged from fines or probation up to
one year in jail for the least serious possession offense l o to a possible 5 to 15 years for the most serious possession offense. 11 The sale
provisions ranged from a potential maximum of 2 1/3 to 7 for the
least serious offense (Sale 3rd) 12 to 8 1/2 to 25 years for the most
serious offenses (Sale 1st). 13 From 1965 until 1969, the worst case
scenario for the most serious drug dealer was 8 1/3 to 25 years. In
addition, in 1966 the Narcotics Control Act 1 4 recognized drug addiction as a disease and the addict as a sick person in need of
treatment and established a comprehensive program of drug
treatment facilities with the aim of rehabilitation rather than in15
carceration.
II. THE ROCKEFELLER DRUG LAW AMENDMENTS

A. Possession
In 1969, however, the first of the Rockefeller-initiated changes
drug consisting of 100 or more cigarettes containing cannabis, or 1 or more preparations,
compounds, mixtures or substances of aggregate weight of 1 or more ounces, containing
any of respective alkaloids or salts of heroin, morphine or cocaine, or 1 or more ounces
containing any cannabis, or 2 or more ounces containing raw of prepared opium, or 2 or
more ounces, containing 1 or more than 1 of any of the other narcotic drugs).
9 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.30 (McKinney 1967) (creating 3rd degree D-class felony
for criminal knowing and unlawful sale of dangerous drug); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.35
(McKinney 1967) (creating 2nd degree C-class felony for criminal knowing and unlawful
sale of dangerous narcotic drug); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.40 (McKinney 1967) (creating 1st
degree B-class felony for criminal knowing and unlawful sale of dangerous drug to person
less than 21 years old).
10 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §220.00 (McKinney 1967) (indicating required imprisonment
for Class A misdemeanor violators).
11 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §220.20 (McKinney 1967) (indicating required imprisonment
for Class C felony violators).
12 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §220.15 (McKinney 1967) (indicating required imprisonment
for Class D felony violators).
13 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §220.40 (McKinney 1967) (indicating required imprisonment
for Class A felony violators).
14 See N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §§ 200.00 (McKinney 1967). The New York legislature stated that the purpose of this article was to provide a comprehensive program of
human renewal of narcotic addicts in rehabilitation centers and aftercare programs. Id.
15 See People v. Fuller, 24 N.Y.2d 292, 301 (1969). The court indicated that the basic
premise of New York's narcotic control program is a rehabilitative one. Id. The court further stated that the extended period of deprivation of liberty the statute mandates can
only be justified as necessary to fulfill the purposes of the program. Id.; see also People v.
Bennet, 39 A.D.2d 320, 322 (1972). The court stated that the New York legislature created
the Narcotic Addiction Control Commission in 1966 and authorized it to "formulate a
comprehensive plan for the long range development... of adequate services and facilities
for the prevention and control of narcotic addiction, custody, treatment, aftercare and rehabilitation of narcotic addicts certified to the care and custody of the commission." Id.
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("1969 Amendment") in the drug laws took effect. 16 As of September 1, 1969, the number of drug offense categories for both possession and sale were increased and the penalties for the most serious
offenses were greatly enhanced. 1 7 The 1969 Amendments redesignated the original possession counts 4th, 3rd, 2nd and 1st degrees
to 6th, 5th, 4th and 3rd degrees respectively and added two new
18
categories.
The two new categories, to wit, the new Possession 2nd and Possession 1st, dealt with aggregate weights of eight ounces or more or
sixteen ounces or more of a substance containing drugs such as
heroin, morphine, cocaine and opium. 19 The penalties for the 2nd
Degree-B felony of Possession were set at 8 1/3 to 25 years. 2 0 The
penalty for 1st Degree-A felony Possession was set at 15 years to
16 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220.01-220.40 (McKinney 1969).
17 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220.22, 220.33, 220.44 (McKinney 1969) (outlining changes
Rockefeller initiated that amended seven sections and added three new sections to Penal
Law).
18 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220.22, 220.33 (McKinney 1969). Specifically, the 1969
amendments added the following categories:
Criminal Possession of a Dangerous Drug
§220.22 2nd Degree-B felony
A person is guilty of criminal possession of a dangerous drug in the second degree
when he knowingly and unlawfully possesses a narcotic drug consisting of one or
more preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances of an aggregate weight of
eight ounces or more, containing any of the respective alkaloids or salts of heroin,
morphine or cocaine, or containing raw or prepared opium
Id.
§220.23 1st Degree-A felony
A person is guilty of criminal possession of a dangerous drug in the first degree
when he knowingly and unlawfully possesses a narcotic drug consisting of one or
more preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances of an aggregate weight of sixteen ounces or more, containing any of the respective alkaloids or salts of heroin,
morphine or cocaine, or containing raw or prepared opium
Id.
19 See id. (indicating both sections were classified under criminal possession of dangerous drug category).
20 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §70.00(3)(a)(l) (McKinney 1995).
Minimum period of imprisonment. The minimum period of imprisonment under
an indeterminate sentence shall be at least one year and shall be fixed as follows:
(a) In the case of a class A felony, the minimum period shall be fixed by the court
and specified in the sentence.
(i) For a class A-I felony, such minimum period shall not be less than fifteen
years nor more than twenty-five years; provided that where a sentence, other
than a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole, is imposed upon a
defendant convicted of murder in the first degree as defined in section 125.27 of
this chapter such minimum period shall be not less than twenty years nor more
than twenty-five years.
(ii) For a class A-I1 felony, such minimum period shall not be less than three
years nor more than eight years four months.
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life.21 The 1969 Amendments marked the first time that a punishment for a drug crime in the state of New York carried the same
penalty potential as a homicide. 22
B. Sale

The 1969 Amendment redesignated Sale 3rd, 2nd and 1st to 4th,
3rd and 2nd, respectively and created a new category of Sale 1st.23
The new Sale 1st dealt with aggregate weights of sixteen ounces or
more of such drugs. 24 The new 1st Degree Sale was also classified
as an A felony, carrying corresponding life imprisonment provisions. 25 In addition, a new subdivision to the newly designated 2nd
21 See id.
22 See People v. Molette, 87 Misc.2d 236, 242 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976). The court stated:
In providing for such severe sentences for the violation of certain drug laws, the Legislature was not making a pronouncement that it considered drug law violations to be
more serious than the taking of a human life. Rather, the Legislature was reacting to
the unlawful widespread sale and distribution of drugs within this state which, if allowed to go unchecked and not severely punished, threatened to destroy the very fiber
of our society. The sale of narcotics within this state or anywhere else, is not an isolated event. Rather, drug sales and usage is inseparably associated with other societal ills such as robbery, burglary, assault, and even homicide. It was to stem such a
tide that the severe sentences were imposed. However, the fact that some drug offenses carry higher penalties than certain homicides cannot be interpreted to indicate
that the [sic] former was, or is, considered by the Legislature of this state to be a
more heinous crime than the latter. Another rational basis for the sole exclusion of
certain homicides from the six-month ready rule of CPL Section 30.30 as compared to
other crimes, drug related or otherwise, is the high degree of seriousness of a homicide, often attendant with complex trial preparation procedures.
Id.; see also People v. Askew, 403 N.Y.S.2d 959, 960-61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978). In reversing
a life imprisonment sentence of a defendant convicted of possession of $20 worth of cocaine, Justice Lowe of the Supreme Court Bronx County argued that the Broadie decision
was no longer supported in light of new data proving that the imposition of life imprisonment resulted in higher, rather than lower minor possession convictions. Id. She agreed,
however, with the Broadiecourt that, "drug offenses are punished more severely and inflexibly than almost any other offense in the State," with "murder in the First Degree
authorizing capital punishment is the only crime punished more severely. Arson in the
First Degree, Kidnapping in the First Degree and Murder in the Second Degree carry the
same mandatory life sentences." Id.; People v. Askew, 66 A.D.2d 710, 713 (N.Y. App. Div.
1978) (Fein, J., concurring). This argument was accepted, cautiously on appeal. "In imposing sentence, it was clearly not within the province of the trial justice to refuse to follow or to overrule the holdings to the contrary by the Court of Appeals. Both the trial
court and this court are duty bound to adhere to the determinations by the highest court
of this State until overruled by that court." Id.
23 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.33 (McKinney 1969) (creating 1st degree felony for possession of sixteen ounces or more of unlawful substance); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW §
220.45 (McKinney 1969) (codifying 1969 amendment creating 1st degree A-class felony for
criminal sale of dangerous drug when one knowingly and unlawfully sells narcotic drug
consisting of 1 or more preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances of an aggregate
weight of 16 ounces or more containing any of alkaloids of heroin, morphine or containing
raw or prepared opium).
24 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.33 (McKinney 1969).
25 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.33 (McKinney 1969) (indicating criminal possession in
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Degree Sale provision included the sale of aggregate weights of
eight ounces or more of drugs such as heroin, morphine, cocaine or
opium. 2 6

While both the Governor's 1969 Memorandum and the 1969
Amendments clearly distinguished between small scale sellers and
large scale pushers, 2 7 the passage of the New York State Substance Control Act ("1973 Act") revisions in 1973,28 constituting the
core of the Rockefeller drug laws, essentially eliminated this distinction. As a result, the small scale pusher-addict was equated
with the large scale pusher and consequently subjected to heightened penalties. The 1973 Act drastically revised the format of the
drug laws by adding several new categories, 2 9 greatly enhancing
sentencing penalties, 30 and making the imposition of enhanced
sentences mandatory. 3 1 The basic concept of the 1973 Act was to
distinguish between degrees of possession and sale by weight of the
prohibited substance. 3 2 Under the 1969 Amendments only certain
drugs such as heroin, morphine and cocaine were classified into
degrees, which were differentiated by the quantity of the prepara-

first degree is class A felony).
26 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.22 (McKinney 1969); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.40
(McKinney 1969) (creating 2nd degree B-class felony for criminal sale of dangerous drug,
knowingly and unlawfully, of aggregate weight of 8 ounces or more of.. .heroin, morphine
or cocaine, or containing raw or prepared opium).
27 See Governor Rockefeller's Memorandum on Approval of Bills, 1969 N.Y. Laws 787.
The Governor stated:
The bills stiffen the penalties for pushers of hard-core narcotics-heroin morphine,
cocaine or opium.. .The bills quite properly distinguish between small-scale sellers of
hard-core narcotics who are often themselves addicted to the drugs they sell and large
scale sellers who reap enormous weekly profits from plying their insidious trade. The
severity of the increases in penalties that the bills provide is justified by the nature
and the quantity of the drugs involved.
The alarming rise in the incidence of the use of narcotics, particularly among
young people, and the resultant permanent damage to mind and body requires stern
measures commensurate with the seriousness of the crime. It is well established that
the distribution of narcotic drugs on a large scale basis is accomplished by means of
an organized crime network.
We will all hope that the bills, by increasing substantially the criminal penalties
for illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs, may serve as an effective deterrent
to the spread of the illicit drug trade.
Id.
28 See 1972 N.Y. LAWS 878. The New York State Substance Control Act of 1973
amended New York's Public Health Law and Penal Law in relation to "controlled substances" and "dangerous drugs." Id.
29
30
31
32

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
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tion, compound, mixture or substance containing the drug. 3 3 The

unlawful possession of other contraband drugs, such as stimulants,
depressants and hallucinogens, was denominated a class A misdemeanor regardless of the quantity involved. 34 The 1973 Act
changed that by making the possession or sale of a specified
amount of a broader variety of drugs a felony 35 and by formally
substituting the term "dangerous drug' with "controlled substances." 36 Thus, three categories of drug possession and three
categories of sale required mandatory imprisonment carrying
minimum ranges of 1 to life (A-III), 6 to life (A-II) or 15 years to life
(A-I). In 1973, the Legislature also established more severe penalties for second felony offenders and restricted plea bargaining options. 37 The 1973 enactments expressed the public and governmental frustration with the drug abuse problem, revealing an almost
hysterical willingness to deal with it even if the toughest sanctions
had to be imposed. 38
33 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.22 (McKinney 1969) (creating criminal possession in
second degree for possession of 8 ounces or more of dangerous drug); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
220.33 (McKinney 1969) (creating criminal possession in first degree for possession of 16
ounces or more).
34 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.05 (McKinney 1969).
35 See generally ROSENBLATT, NEW YoRu's NEw DRUG LAWS AND SENTENCES
STATUTES (1973).
36 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.18 (McKinney 1973); see also N.Y. Penal Law §§ 220.03,
220.06, 220.09, 220.12, 220.16, 220.18, 220.21, 220.31, 220.34, 220.31, 220.39, 220.41,
220.43 (McKinney 1973) (codifying substitution of "dangerous drug" with "controlled substance").
37 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.10(5) (McKinney 1969).
38 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §220.10, Paul Hechtman, Practice Commentaries, at 7
(McKinney 1980). Mr. Hechtman observed the following regarding the 1973 amendments:
That revision 'mirrored many of society's concerns and attitudes about the problems inherent in and created by drug abuse. Frustration with the seeming intractability of the drug problem was reflected in the hard line approach to the classification
of drug crimes and to tougher and more restrictive sentencing options upon conviction.'
Mr. Hechtman's Commentaries were based upon Governor Rockefeller's 1973 Executive Memorandum which in the strongest tones reflected the public's concerns as
follows:
Virtually every poll of public concerns documents that the number one, growing
concern of the American people is crime and drugs - coupled with an all-pervasive
fear for the safety of their person and their property.
This reign of fear cannot be tolerated.
The law-abiding people of this State have the right to expect tougher and more effective actin from their elected leaders to protect them from lawlessness and crime.
People are terrorized by the continued prevalence of narcotic addiction and the
crime and human destruction it breeds.
People are outraged by the existence of corruption within the very law enforcement system itself.
People have lost patience with courts that dally and delay in bringing criminal
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO THE ROCKEFELLER
DRUG LAWS: JUDICIAL ABDICATION
elements to justice.
People are often baffled and disheartened by revolving-door criminal justice and a
correctional system that doesn't seem to correct.
I will now deal with each of these areas separately.
1. Narcotics
This is a time for brutal honesty regarding narcotics addiction.
In this State, we have tried every possible approach to stop addiction and save the
addict through education and treatment-hoping that we could rid society of this disease and drastically reduce mugging on the streets and robbing in the homes.
We have allocated over $1 billion to ever form of education against drugs and
treatment of the addict through commitment, therapy, and rehabilitation.
But let's be frank - let's 'tell it like it is':
We have achieved very little permanent rehabilitation - and have found no cure.
a. Need for Effective Deterrence for the Pushing of Hard Drugs
Lots of wonderful young people have died - and hundreds of thousands more have
been and are being crippled for life.
Addiction has kept on growing.
A rising percentage of our high school and college students, from every background and economic level, have become involved, whether as victims or pushers or
both.
The crime, the muggings, the robberies, the murders associated with addiction
continue to spread a reign of terror.
Whole neighborhoods have been as effectively destroyed by addicts as by an invading army.
We face the risk of undermining our will as a people - and the ultimate destruction of our society as a whole.
This has to stop.
This is going to stop.
Frankly, all the laws we now have on the books won't work to deter the pusher of
drugs.
The police are frustrated by suspended sentences and plea bargaining in the
courts for those they have arrested - and therefore are discouraged from effectively
enforcing the law.
The prosecutors are overwhelmed by the backlog of cases and settle for pleas of
guilty on reduced charges - rather than press for a conviction on more serious charges
that would have a real deterrent effect - because the latter would result in long
drawn-out jury trials.
And the judges, weighed down by calendars running months and years behind,
hand out suspended sentences or go along with pleas of guilt or minor offenses that
result in sentences of only six months to a year.
We have this choice:
-Either we can go on as we have been, with little real hope of changing the present trend;
-Or we must take those stern measures that, I have become convinced, common
sense demands.
We must create an effective deterrent to the pushing of the broad spectrum of
hard drugs.
In my opinion, society has no alternatives.
I therefore am proposing the following program for dealing with the illegal pushers of drugs including heroin, amphetamines, LSD, hashish and other dangerous
drugs
Life Prison Sentences for All Pushers.
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Almost immediately after the enactment of the 1973 Act, the
sentencing provisions were challenged as being violative of the
cruel and unusual punishment clause of the federal and state constitutions.39 The New York Court of Appeals, however, unanimously held that the Rockefeller drug laws passed constitutional
muster. 40 The court clearly framed the issue: Whether drug laws
mandating life imprisonment and lifetime parole on parole release,
39 See People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 110 (1975) (upholding constitutionality of life
imprisonment for drug offenders); see also Bellavia v. Fogg, 613 F.2d 369, 374 (2d Cir.
1979) (affirming constitutionality of imposing life sentence upon defendants convicted of
possession under 1975 amendments. ); People v. Thompson, 83 N.Y.2d 477, 487-88 (1994)
(affirming constitutional applicability of life imprisonment for 17 year-old's conviction for
sale of 214 vials of cocaine for $2,000, yet expressing doubts as to continued vitality of
'Rockefeller drug laws'); People v. Donovan, 59 N.Y.2d 834, 836 (1983) (affirming imposition of 15 year to life sentence for procuring drugs at request of defendant's boyfriend);
People v. Jones, 39 N.Y.2d 694, 697 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding constitutionality of
applying 15 year to life imprisonment sentence on defendant 'millhand' in drug manufacturing ring convicted of Class A-I criminal possession of a dangerous drug in the first degree despite others receiving lesser statutory sentences); People v. Wanton, 167 A.D.2d
202, 203 (A.D. 1990) (affirming concurrent terms of imprisonment of 15 years to life for
criminal sale and possession of controlled substance in first degree and to three years for
third-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance); People v. Miranda, 547
N.Y.S.2d 491, 492 (A.D. 1989) (affirming mandatory minimum 15 years to life for first degree sale and possession of a controlled substance where defendant willing sold ten ounces
of cocaine, had previously sold the same amount and encouraged undercover officer who
made the buy to cheat his backers); People v. Buffa, 139 A.D.2d 751, 752 (A.D. 1988) (affirming sentence of an indeterminate term of three years to life imprisonment, the minimum permissible term for a conviction of a class A- II felony offense); People v. Buckmaster, 139 A D.2d 659, 659 (A.D.2d 1988) (affirming plea bargained sentence of 5 to life for
criminal sale and criminal possession in first degree, of nine ounces of cocaine, class A-Il
felonies as not grossly disproportionately "violative of constitutional limitations"); People
v. Ortiz, 64 N.Y.2d 997, 999 (1985) C'the mandatory sentences imposed upon defendant
are not so grossly disproportionate to the offenses committed as to amount to an unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment"); People v. Garcia, 99 A.D.2d 738, 739 (A.D.
1984) (reversing class A-I felony sentencing for possession of one pound of cocaine with
intent to distribute as inconsistent with N.Y. Penal Law §§70.00); People v. Piccoli, 62
A-D.2d 1078, 1078 (A.D.1978) (affirming plea bargained sentences of six years to life on
his plea of guilty of the crime of criminal possession of controlled substance in the second
degree); People v. Ward, 57 A.D.2d 967, 967 (A.D. 1977) (rejecting appeal on grounds that
"the mandatory sentence provisions of section 70.00 of the Penal Law constitute cruel and
unusual punishment, and are greatly disproportionate to the offenses committed."); People v. Portanova, 56 A.D.2d 265, 276 (A.D. 1977) (affirming constitutionality of disparate
sentences among co-defendants, where one was charged with class A-I felony and sentenced to mandatory minimum of 15 years to life and other plead down to criminal sale of
controlled substance in the third degree, class A-III felony, who was sentenced by same
judge to four years to life). Compare, People v. Easton, 629 N.Y.S. 2d 15, 216 (A.D. 1995)
(reducing 15 year to life sentence to three years where criminal possession in first degree
conviction was defendant's first offense and he supported a wife and three children); People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 525 (1978) (reversing on due process grounds a 15 year to
life sentence on first time offender who was actively and insistently encouraged to sell
narcotics by the police). See, e.g., Carmona v. United States, 576 F.2d 405, 417 (2d Cir.
1978) (holding that sentencing to life imprisonment under 1973 amendments of two defendants for sale of relatively small quantities of cocaine was constitutional per 8th
amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment where constitutional
challenge was based on duration of sentence).
40 See Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d at 110.
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prescribed sentences so disproportionate as to constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. 4 1 Recognizing that the new laws punished
drug offenses more severely and inflexibly than almost any other
offense in the state4 2 and that drug trafficking was punished more
severely in New York than in other jurisdictions, the Court of Appeals reluctantly deferred to the Legislature's attempts to redress
the epidemic drug problem threatening society. 4 3 The Court fur-

ther concluded that the Legislature was within its discretion in acknowledging that sentences of life imprisonment sentences properly emphasized isolation and deterrence
rather than
rehabilitation. 4 4 Thus when faced with a serious drug epidemic,
41 See id. (questioning whether 'drug' laws constituted cruel and unusual punishment).
42 See id. at 115. The Court aptly pointed that only murder in the first degree carried
a greater statutory penalty, capital punishment. Id. at 117. Moreover, arson in the first
degree, kidnapping in the first degree, and murder in the second degree carry the same
mandatory life terms. Id. Even a third-time felony offender will be subject to the same
mandatory life sentence, under special circumstances Id. Among class A felonies, the narcotics offenses alone are not subject to plea negotiations. Id. at 115-16. Furthermore,
among class A felony offenders, only those convicted of sale or possession of narcotics are
barred from being completely discharged after five years of unrevoked parole. Id. Finally,
more serious crimes such as manslaughter, kidnapping in the second degree, rape, robbery, and arson of an occupied building are ranked lower than the drug offenses as B felonies carrying a discretionary maximum sentence of 25 years and no minimum sentence.
Id.
43 See id. at 113-17 (noting court does not concur nor necessarily agree with legislature's rationale for adopting imposed sanctions).
44 See id. at 110-15. The Court specifically observed:
The Legislature may distinguish among the ills of society which require a criminal sanction, and prescribe, as it reasonably views them, punishments appropriate to
each...
In assessing the gravity of a criminal offense, the primary consideration is the
harm it causes to society. The Legislature, in making this assessment, could properly
view criminal narcotics sales not as a series of isolated transactions, but as symptoms
of the widespread and pernicious phenomenon of drug distribution. Social harm in
drug distribution is great indeed. The drug seller, at every level of distribution, is at
the root of the pervasive cycle of destructive drug abuse.
Thus the Legislature could reasonably have found that drug trafficking is a generator of collateral crime, even violent crime. And violent crime is not, of course, the
only destroyer of men and the social fabric. Drug addiction degrades and impoverishes those whom it enslaves. This debilitation of men, as well as the disruption of
their families, the Legislature could also lay at the door of the drug traffickers.
Measured thus by the harm it inflicts upon the addict, and, through him, upon society as a whole, drug dealing in its present epidemic proportions is a grave offense of
high rank.
The reasons for isolating drug traffickers have already been suggested. The Legislature could find that narcotics sellers were the crucial link in the pernicious cycle
of drug abuse; that sellers spawn addiction, and that addicts, in turn, may become
sellers. As a minimal proposition, the seller, in feeding the addict's habit, frustrates
rehabilitation. The Legislature could conclude that the best way to break the chain
would be to remove the seller from society for a long duration, and, upon his return,
to continue surveillance through lifetime parole.

1999]

T9E ROCKEFELLER DRUG LAWS

the Court of Appeals chose to allow the executive and legislative
experiment to continue on.4 5 Throughout the Court's decision,
46
however, are serious doubts as to whether it would work.
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE ROCKEFELLER DRUG LAWS

By 1979, almost ten years after the enactment of the initial
Deterrence is the other obvious purpose. It was thought that rehabilitation efforts had failed; that the epidemic of drug abuse could be quelled only by the threat of
inflexible, and therefore certain, exceptionally severe punishment
Thus, to achieve the deterrence, so far seemingly elusive, the would-be drug trafficker had to be put on notice that, should he be caught, his fate was sealed regardless of his position in the hierarchy of distribution and regardless of the quantity of
drugs in which he dealt.
Id.
45 See id. at 110-18. The Court emphasized the reasonableness of legislative findings
that drug trafficking is responsible for violent crimes and also dehabilitates those who it
controls, thus leading to disruption in families. Id. As if to still hold the door open for future judicial intervention, Judge Breitel concluded his opinion by asserting "this is not to
say that in some rare case on its particular facts it may not be found that the statutes are
unconstitutional." Id.; People v. Jones, 39 N.Y.2d 694, 694 (1976). Almost prophetically in
the following year, Judge Breitel, attempted to so hold, with respect to a fifteen year to
life sentence imposed upon a drug middleman after trial where the leaders had received
substantially lower sentences after plea agreements. Judge Breitel, however, found himself one of three dissenters with the majority of the Court upholding the sentence. In a
vigorous opinion joined in by Judges Wachtler and Fuchsberg, Judge Breitel declared:
"The mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, really lifetime parole, imposed in this case
is unconscionable and barbaric because of the gross inequality of treatment of like persons
involved in the identical crime. Since the earliest conscious evolution of justice in western
society, the dominating principle has been that of equality of treatment of like persons
similarly situated, a principle at the root of any rational system of justice." Id. at 698.
46 See Broadie, 37 N.Y. 2d at 114-18. The court stated:
Defendants argue that the new sanctions neither favor, nor presume much likelihood of their future rehabilitation. True, the elimination of discretionary sentencing,
and the substitution of inflexible maximum sentences have been often tried and as often abandoned as 'remedies'. Equally true, there is considerable highly-respected
authority which questions the wisdom of eliminating flexible sentencing standards in
drug cases in favor of long, mandatory prison terms.
The Court does not necessarily approve or concur in the Legislature's judgment in
adopting these sanctions. Their pragmatic value might well be questioned, since
more than a half century of increasingly severe sanctions has failed to stem, if indeed
it has not caused, a parallel crescendo of drug abuse. The premises upon which the
Legislature has proceeded have been subjected to vigorous dispute. Indeed, the debate moves beyond the wisdom of substituting long mandatory prison terms in place
of flexible sentencing, of emphasizing isolation and deterrence over rehabilitation.
Even the questions whether 'the policy of criminalization, which raises the cost and
increases the difficulty of obtaining drugs, does in fact make the drug user a proselytizer of others in order that he may obtain funds to acquire his own drugs; and
whether 'the compulsion of the addict to obtain drugs and the moneys to purchase
them causes him to commit collateral crime that otherwise he might not commit', are
questions about which reasonable men can and do differ. Given the present state of
criminological knowledge, perhaps only time will tell whether the course pursued will
prove effective or will fail as every similar effort since the Harrison Act of 1914 has
failed.
Id.
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Rockefeller drug initiatives, the New York State prison population
had virtually doubled from approximately 12,000 in 1969 to 24,000
in 197947 and the percentage of incarcerated non-violent drug offenders increased from about ten percent in 1969 to over thirty
percent in 1979. During the same time period, the crime rates continued to increase. 4 8
Beginning in the late 1970's, the Legislature realized that the
more stringent drug laws had succeeded only in overcrowding New
York prisons and failing to deter drug use or crime. 4 9 The Legislature, judicial system and successive Governors attempted to ameliorate the harsh effects of the sentencing laws. 50 What they failed
to confront, however, was the more difficult question of whether
those laws should ultimately be repealed. Unwilling to countenance political suicide, the different branches of government took
modest steps to try to accomplish indirectly what they could not do
directly. 5 1 This piecemeal approach, however, has proven to be
largely ineffective and often hypocritical, merely creating a pattern
of half-hearted measures rather than a new procedural approach.
V. LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL AND EXEcUTIvE ATTEMPTS AT
AMELIORAZATION

With the passage of the Marijuana Reform Act 5 2 in 1977, the
Legislature excluded marijuana from the definition of crimes
dealing with controlled substances 53 and created a separate law to
deal with sale and possession of marijuana cases. 5 4 The new article
was specifically enacted to reduce the penalties for possession and
47 See Bellacosa, supra note 4, at 384 (noting New York State incarcerated 12,000
inmates between late 1920's until 1970's).
48 See Rudolph J. Gerber, Arizona Criminal Code Revision: Twenty Years Later, 40
ARIz. L. REV. 143, 168 (1998) (noting laws had no discernable effect on crime or drug use
in New York).
49 See William W. Schwarzer, Book Review, Court Reform on Trial, by Malcolm M.
Feeley, 71 CALF. L. REV. 1572, 1576 (1983) (noting Rockefeller drug law prove to be ineffective imposing harsh sentences for marginal offenders, slight increase in punishment for
major offenders and it was expensive to implement).
50 See People v. Thompson, 190 A.D.2d 162, 170-71 (N.Y. 1994) (finding by appellate
division that imposition of such harsh punishment violates constitution).
51 See Thompson, 190 A.D.2d at 167 (noting that Rockefeller drug laws failed to reach
their objective).
52 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221 (McKinney 1998).
53 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3306 (McKinney 1998) (noting that Legislature did
not, however, exclude concentrated cannabis from statute).
54 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 221.25, 221.30, 221.35, 221.40, 221.45, 221.50, 221.55
(McKinney 1998) (listing crimes defined as dealing with controlled substances).
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sale of marijuana and to decriminalize the possession of a small
amount for personal use. 5 5 The new marijuana penalties which
remain in effect today set maximum penalties for marijuana offenses at fifteen days for a violation offense to fifteen years for a
sale in the first degree. 56 The possibility of life imprisonment for
marijuana offenses was therefore eliminated.
57
In 1979, the Legislature also enacted a series of amendments
58
to somewhat soften the harsh effects of the Article 220 drug laws.
The Legislature justified these amendments on the grounds that
"the narcotics laws were overly harsh, often inequitable and were
not conducive to efficient drug law enforcement." 59 These amendments affected three main areas: (1) increasing the amount or
weight of the drug necessary to constitute the higher level felonies; 60 (2) the downward adjustment of the minimum sentence
range for Class A-II convictions; 6 1 and (3) the elimination of the
62
Class A-III classification.
As to the weights, for the class A-I crimes, the threshold weight
of the drug necessary to constitute the crime was doubled from one
ounce to two ounces. 6 3 For the class A-Il possession crime, the
weight was also doubled and for the class A-II sale crime, the
weight was quadrupled. 6 4 Former class A-III crimes were reclassified class B, and a new class B possession crime of between onehalf and two ounces of a narcotic drug was introduced. 6 5 In the
sentencing structure, the minimum period of imprisonment upon a
class A-II conviction was lowered from six to three years. Finally,
the 1973 law contained a retroactive resentencing section for those
previously convicted of class A-II or A-III crimes which offered the
55 See Legislative Findings and Statement of Purpose, 1977 N.Y. LAWS 360 (noting
although legislature does not encourage or condone use of marijuana purpose of act is to
ensure that persons who commit conduct that violate act are not subject to harsh penalties).
56 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.15 (McKinney 1998).
57 See 1979 N.Y. LAWS 410 (amending Article 220 of New York's Penal Law to reduce
severity of sentences).
58 See id
59 See Hechtman, supra note 38, at 7.
60 See id.
61 See id.
62 See id.
63 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §220, Willaim C. Donnino, Practice Commentaries, at 7

(McKinney 1989).
64 See id.
65 See id.
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66
possibility of lower sentences.
As a result of the ability to re-sentence certain drug offenders
pursuant to the 1979 enactments, the courts proceeded to do so and
several hundreds of drug offenders received reduced sentences.
Further, appellate courts often opted to reduce sentences imposed
for A felony drug offenses to the minimum possible rather than the
67
higher ranges which may have been imposed by a trial court.
Further, in 1993 the New York Court of Appeals in People v.
Ryan,68 declared that where the definition of a crime required that
the defendant "knowingly" possess or sell a controlled substance of
a specified pure or aggregate weight, there must be proof that the
defendant knew the weight of the substance as well as the nature
of the substance. 69 For several years, this decision also enabled
drug offenders to receive lower sentences. 70 As of June 10, 1995,
however, the Legislature overruled Ryan.7 1 The Legislature made
knowledge of the weight of the substance a strict liability ele2
ment. 7
At the executive level, efforts to ameliorate the harshness of the
drug laws have involved minor legislative initiatives, 7 3 a pardon or

66 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.09 (McKinney 1989) (permitting re-sentencing of A-II and
A-III offenses to reduce original sentence); N.Y. PENAL LAW §220, William C. Donnino,
Practice Commentaries (McKinney 1989) (stating that A-I and A-Ill offenders could apply for re-sentencing).
67 See People v. Shea, 102 Misc.2d 901, 902 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (allowing re-sentencing of
defendant sentenced to five year to life for criminal sale of controlled substance); People
v. Nathanson, 102 Misc.2d 1022, 1023 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (re-sentencing defendant from one
year to life to one to three years imprisionment).
68 82 N.Y.2d 497 (1993).
69 See id. at 499-504 (interpreting legislative intent to desire stronger punishment for
those possessing larger quantities of controlled substances).
70 See People v. Hill, 85 N.Y.2d 256, 264 (1995) (vacating Appellate Division's affirmation and ordering new trial); see also People v. Sanchez, 86 N.Y.2d 27, 36 (1995) (denying defendant's motion to reduce charges since he should have "known" weight of
drugs).
71 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §220 (McKinney 1989) (moving minimum weight requirement
to follow, rather than precede, controlled substance throughout all sections).
72 See N.Y. PENAL LAw, §220, William C. Donnino, Practice Commentaries (McKinney
1989). While the Legislature did take certain steps in the late 1970s as indicated to eliminate the harshness of the drug laws in the area of PCP or angel dust, it felt it necessary to
increase penalties for those crimes. Id. In 1978, 1979, and 1985 possession and sale
crimes, with respect to PCP or angel dust (phencyclidine) were restructured. Id. The 1985
changes, which formed the current law, were based upon the recommendations of the NY
State Committee on Sentencing Guidelines which indicated the need for increased penalties. Id. Thus, today, these penalties involved B-felony ranges carrying 25 year maximums. Id.
73 See N.Y. PENAL LAW, §220; Paul Hectman, Practice Commentaries (McKinney
1980).
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clemency option, 7 4 and more recently early release programs. 7 5
These combined efforts have had only minimal success. 76 Over the
25 years in which the Rockefeller drug laws have been in effect,
only about 100 drug offenders have received such pardons. 7 7 In
1995, Governor Pataki encouraged the creation of a deportation
program allowing for the removal of several hundred drug offenders who were illegal aliens. 78 Although the program was initially
publicized as applying to only low-level drug offenders, it was actually used to release several hundred drug offenders who were in
the A-1 or A-2 categories. 7 9 Recent public criticism of this program
has led to proposals to restrict its application to the originally intended low level offenders.8 0 Further, through the Sentencing Reform Act of 1995,81 provisions were enacted for sentences of parole
supervision for non-violent second felony drug offenders involving
intensive rehabilitation programs as a substitute for long periods of
incarceration. 8 2 Retroactive parole release was also made available
for certain inmates who were already serving class D or E drug offenses.8 3 Through these actions, the Governor appears to be moving incrementally towards substantive changes in the Rockefeller
drug laws.
VI. THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF THE ROCKEFELLER DRUG LAWS:
74 See A Good Deal for CriminalJustice, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 20, 1997, at 2 (pardoning six
defendants with fifteen to life sentences); Bruce Balestier, PardonedArtist-Inmate Begins
Again as Paralegal,N.Y.L.J., Oct. 14, 1997, at 1 (releasing prisoner early from fifteen to
life sentence).
75 See Paul S. Hechtman, A Good Deal for Criminal Justice,N.Y. L.J., Mar. 20, 1997,
at 2 (indicating early release programs as way to ease drug laws).
76 See Thomas Eddy, Rockefeller Drug Law Critiqued by Inmate, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 2,
1992, at 2 (indicating Rockefeller Drug Laws continue to be overly harsh).
77 See Edward A. Adams, Cuomo Faces Annual Ritual of Deciding on Clemency,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 28, 1992, at 1 (showing former Governor Carey granted more clemencies
than either Governor Cuomo or Governor Pataki); Today's News Update, N.Y.L.J., Dec.
26, 1997, at 1 (indicating Governor Pataki utilized his clemency option to grant pardons to
three defendants convicted of A category drug offenses).
78 See Governor Moves to Eliminate Deportation Option for Serious Drug Dealers,
N.Y. CRIM. L. NEWS, May/June 1998, at 7 (discussing 1995 Sentencing Reform Act that
allowed deportation of illegal alien drug offenders).
79 See Today's News Update,N.Y.L.J., July 11, 1995, at 1 (stating proceedings started
against illegal aliens convicted of drug offenses); see also Stanley Mailman, Early Parole
for Deportationand the Right to a Lawyer, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 23, 1995, at 3 (discussing deportation of Columbian drug offenders).
80 See Kevin Flynn, Program Overhaul Eyed, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 22, 1998, at 6
(urging release of all but A-I offenders).
81 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 410.91 (McKinney 1999).
82 See id.
83 See id.
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CALLS FOR REFORM
The legislative, judicial and executive efforts to ameliorate the
harsh effects of the Rockefeller drug laws have only had a minimal
impact. Thus, in 1998 the overall prison population in New York
State jails stands at approximately 70,000, almost three times the
prison population which existed in 1979.84 Of that number, nonviolent drug offenders comprise about 30% with their prison incar85
ceration estimated to cost in the billions of dollars.
Judge Breitel, in People v. Broadie, stated that "only time will
tell whether the course pursued will prove effective or fail."8 6 After
twenty-five years of dealing with the Rockefeller drug laws, it has
become more and more apparent to all segments of the criminal
justice system that they have had excessively harsh and devastating effects upon the lives of individual defendants while not accomplishing the desired goal of eliminating drug abuse. Consequently,
the Governor and Legislature must heed the growing calls for reform. Significantly, the judiciary has expressed its keen interest in
favor of reform. In People v. Thompson,8 7 a case involving a fifteen-year to life sentence for a 17 year old female defendant, a majority of the Court of Appeals who voted to uphold the sentence,
nonetheless, called for Legislative relief from the excessive sentence. 8 8 Moreover, Chief Judge Kaye herself recently broached the
84 See Gary Spencer, Effort Begun to Ease Rockefeller Drug Laws, N.Y. L.J., May 7,
1998, at 1 (urging original authors of Rockefeller drug laws to provide judges with discretion).
85 See William Sherman & Allen Salkin, War Against Rampaging Parolees, N.Y.
POST, Mar. 22, 1998, at 7 (noting that average costs of prison incarceration for New York
State prisoners estimated to be $27,000.00 per year).
86 37 N.Y.2d 118 (1975).
87 83 N.Y.2d 477 (1994).
88 See id. at 487.
That is not to say that we disagree with the strongly held convictions of our dissenting colleagues and of the majority at the Appellate Division in the instant case
(190 AD2d, at 166-167) that the harsh mandatory treatment of drug offenders embodied in the 1973 legislation has failed to deter drug trafficking or control the epidemic of drug abuse in society, and has resulted in the incarceration of many offenders whose crimes arose out of their own addiction and for whom the cost of
imprisonment would have been better spent on treatment and rehabilitation. The
experience of the last two decades has clearly vindicated the doubts Chief Judge Breitel expressed in People v. Broadie on the wisdom of the draconian drug sentencing
laws." Judges Bellacosa and Ciparick dissented and voted to uphold the sentence of
eight years to life imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the Appellate Division
on the ground that the rare Broadie exception applied to the facts of the case. Angela
Thompson, the defendant in the case, was one of the defendants granted clemency by
Governor Pataki in December of 1997 and even the trial judge, Juanita Bing Newton,
wrote on her behalf in a case which "brought tears to her eyes.
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issue of modifying the drug sentencing laws when she called for a
commission to review "current procedures and to rethink our mandatory drug sentence laws as they apply to non-violent offenders."8 9 In February of this year she offered two new additional proposals for modification of the mandatory drug sentences. In
addition, a prominent citizen's group has called for modification
and reform. 9 0
Id.; see also Raymond Hernandez, Governor Commutes Sentences of Three Convicted on
Drug Charges,N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 25, 1997, at 4 (indicating lawmakers' believe that Rockefeller laws create severe penalties for low level offenses). See generally Gerald E. Lynch,
Towards a Model Penal Code, Second (Federal): The Challenge of the Special Part, 2
BUFF. CRIM. REV. 297, 313 (1998) (explaining historic aspiration for penal codes not to
contain many degree rankings or overlapping offenses).
89 See Gary Spencer, Kaye Urges Rewrite of CriminalLaws, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 24, 1998,
at 1 (stating that "[m]any of our sentencing laws, particulary our tough mandatory drug
sentencing laws, apply to non-violent offenders have proven less than effective in achieving their objective and the cost has been very great').
90 See Gary Spencer, Effort Begun to Ease Rockefeller Drug Laws, N.Y.L.J., May 7,
1998, at 1.
In a striking admission of fallibility, several leaders who played prominent roles
in enacting and enforcing the Rockefeller drug laws yesterday called for reforms that
would relax the strict mandatory minimum sentences for non-violent drug offenders.
The reform advocates include former Majority Leader Warren M. Anderson of
Binghamtom, who headed the State Senate when the laws were passed in 1973; former Senator H. Douglas Barclay of Syracuse, who sponsored the bill; and two former
Court of Appeals judges, Richard D. Simons and Stewart F. Hancock, Jr., which
Court struck down judicial efforts to provide some sentencing discretion to trial
judges.
Richard J. Bartlett, who later became the state's first chief administrative judge,
endorsed the mandatory sentencing scheme while serving as chairman of Governor
Nelson A. Rockefeller's Crime Control Commission in 1973.
I thought it was right then, but I don't think history has proved me right," Mr.
Bartless said at a press conference yesterday, observing that the state's prison population has grown from 13,000 to nearly 70,000 since the laws were enacted without
controlling the drug trade.
They are members of the Campaign for Effective Criminal Justice, a group of political, judicial, religious and business figures organized by former State Senator John
R. Dunne, who served as Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights under President
George Bush.
The group's goal is not to repeal the Rockefeller sentencing laws or the Second
Felony Offender Law outright or even to decriminalize any current drug crime, Mr.
Dunne said, but rather to give judges the discretion to sentence non-violent offenders
to drug treatment and community service instead of to long mandatory prison terms.
Our sense of urgency arises from the fact that tens of thousands of low-level drug
offenders have been sent to prison at great expense to the public and to little effect,"
he said, noting that more than 21,000 drug offenders are currently incarcerated under the Rockefeller and Second Felony Offender laws, roughly one-third of all inmates
in the prison system.
Other members include Milton Mollen, former Deputy Mayor for Public Safety;
former U.S. Attorney Whitney North Seymour; former Congressman Floyd Flake; and
Bishop Howard Hubbard of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany.
The new group adds to a growing chorus of official voices calling for reexamination of the mandatory sentencing scheme, a chorus that includes prosecutors and
some influential legislators.
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VII. GOVERNOR PATAKI'S INITIATIVES AS OFFERING THE BEST
POSSIBILITY FOR MAJOR REVISIONS

Just as it took Richard Nixon, a staunch anti-communist, to
open the door to Red China and to gain acceptance for such actions, it may take Governor Pataki, a strong anti-crime advocate,
to effectuate and obtain public acceptance for major changes in
New York's tough drug laws. In many ways, as was already indicated, the Governor has already moved in this direction.
Governor Pataki's legislative initiatives to fight crime during the
last three years appear to have as their focus, stricter penalties for
violent crimes and repeat offenders while recognizing that providing prison space for these violent criminals may require more rehabilitation programs and shorter prison terms for the non-violent
drug offender.9 1 Thus in the next few years, this dual focus of the
Governor's criminal justice objective may create a more receptive
atmosphere to the possibility of eliminating the severe mandatory
lifetime sentences for certain categories of drug offenders.
A. ProposedRevisions

The Governor has correctly focused upon violent crime and repeat offenders as the main component of his legislative program.
The successful enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1995
and Jenna's Law92 greatly increased sentencing penalties for first
time violent felony offenders and repeat violent felony offenders
while at the same time, restricting sentencing and parole options.
Since last year, nearly 22,000 of the State's 70,000 prisoners were
incarcerated for non-violent drug crimes. 93 A logical proposal could
Id.
91 See Gary Spencer, Assembly Compromise on Parole May Ease Rockefeller Drug
Law, N.Y. L.J., June 4, 1998, at 1 (indicating Assembly's criminal justice plan that toughens sentences for repeat offenders and diverts non-violent drug offenders to treatment
programs).
92 See Bonnie Cohen-Gallet, Jenna's Law Adds New Layer to Complex Sentencing
Scheme, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 20, 1998, at 1 (stating that even first-time offenders must serve
finite sentence before they may be released from state incarceration).
93 See Harvard Hollenberg, Drug Laws Went Wrong Twentyfive Years Ago, NA'L L.J.,
June 1, 1998, at 21 (indicating that from 1973 to 1998 seventy thousand went to prision);
Drug Sentence Policy Opposed by Wardens, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 22, 1994, at 2 (indicating that
one hundred and fiftyseven wardens consider it wasteful to utilize prision space for mandatory minimum incarceration of nonviolent offenders); see also David C. Leven, Curing
America's Addiction to Prisons, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 641, 646 (1993) (examining that in
New York's percentage of prisoners incarcerated for violoent offenses is decreasing while
percentage incarcerated for nonviolent drug offenses has increased fourfold).
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be made to reduce the sentences for non-drug offenders including
the elimination of the present life sentences 94 in order to provide
the necessary jail space to accommodate the increased terms for
violent felony offenders and possible increases in penalties for violent juvenile offenders. The revisions in the Rockefeller drug laws
could be easily accomplished by returning to the original 1965 provisions which contained no life penalties for any of the drug offenses. The present drug laws could be restructured to reduce each
current category beginning with Possession Fifth and Sale Fifth by
one degree and consolidating the present A-II and A-I categories of
sale and possession into a single B category. Thus, no A category
containing life imprisonment options would exist and the top count
for any drug offense would be a B felony carrying a maximum
range of 25 years. My proposed restructured Article 220 would be
as follows:
POSSESSION
§ 220.03 Criminal Possession in the Fifth Degree 9 5 -A Misdemeanor
§ 220.06 Criminal Possession in the Fourth Degree 96 -E Felony
§ 220.09 Criminal Possession in the Third Degree 9 7 -D Felony
§ 220.16 Criminal Possession in the Second Degree 98 -C Felony

94 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991). The Court recognized the retroactive legislation as a method of reducing life sentences. Id. Just as in 1979, these reductions can also be made retroactive to persons previously sentenced.
95 See Frank 0. Bowman, Playing "21" With Narcotics Enforcement: A Response to
Professor Carrington,52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 937 (1995). The current seventh degree is simply changed to fifth degree without any further changes. Id.
96 There is no present sixth degree and the current fifth degree would become fourth degree and the current D level would be reduced to an E Felony.
97 The current fourth degree would become third degree and the C level would be reduced
to a D Felony.
98 The current third degree would become second degree and the B Felony would be reduced to a C level.

632

ST JOHN'SJOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 13:613

§ 220.18 Criminal Possession in the First Degree 9 9 -B Felony
SALE
§ 220.31 Criminal Sale in the Fourth Degree 0 0-E Felony
§ 220.34 Criminal Sale in the Third Degreel 0 1 -D Felony
§ 220.39 Criminal Sale in the Second Degreel 0 2 -C Felony
§ 220.41 Criminal Sale in the First Degreel 0 3 -B Felony
We have been fortunate during the last few years that the crime
rate in our state has dramatically decreased. The adoption of the
proposed restructuring contained herein would not result in a return to lenient sentencing and a renewed increase in the commission of crimes because our current penal law, unlike the 1967 version, contains serious restrictions on plea bargaining and
mandated increased penalties for violent felony offenders and repeat felony offenders. Thus, not only will serious drug offenders
continue to face substantial penalties for their drug offenses, but if
these offenses have resulted in violent criminal conduct or the drug
offender has become a repeat offender, then the most serious possible penalties will become available for imposition. Thus, for example, if a drug offender is indicted for a Class B Possession or Sale
offense, he would not be allowed to enter a guilty plea to less than a
Class D Felony which carries a possible maximum sentence of
seven years.' 0 4 Further, if a drug offender has previously been con99 The current first and second degrees would be combined into a new first degree and
the current A-H and A-I Felonies would be replaced by a B Felony. The current Penal Law §
220.21 would thus be eliminated.
100 The current fifth degree will become fourth degree and the D range will become an E
Felony.
101 The current fourth degree will become third degree and the C range will drop to a D
Felony.
102 The current third degree will become second degree and the B Felony will drop to a C
range.
103 The current second and first degrees would be combined into a single first degree
with the A-il Felony and A-I Felony ranges being reduced to a B Felony. The current first
degree § 220.43 would then be eliminated. If the need for compromise makes it impossible to
remove all life terms, then I would retain it only for the current Sale First Degree under §
220.43 but would in any event reduce the minimum term from 15 years to 5 to at least allow
for greater discretion by sentencing judges where such discretion would be warranted.
104 See N.Y. CRIM. PRO. § 220.10 (5)(a)(iii) (McKinney 1998).
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victed of a felony so as to qualify for Second Offender treatment, he
would be subject to specified minimum and maximum sentences. 10 5
In addition, the ultimate sanction of life imprisonment would
still remain a possibility if a drug offender has committed three or
more felonies since he is subject to punishment as a persistent felony offender under section 70.10.106 Although such a sentence is
within the discretionary powers of the court, it may be imposed
itwhen the court has found that the history and character of the defendant and the nature and circumstances of his criminal conduct
indicate that extended incarceration and lifetime supervision will
best serve the public interest." 107
To further encourage the discretionary use of the life imprisonment option for a persistent felony offender when warranted the
Legislature should reduce the current mandatory fifteen year
minimum of such a sentence to a more reasonable lower level. 108
Both Governor Rockefeller and the court in Broadie focused on
the relationship between drug use, violent crime and recidivism. 109
105 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.06 (3)(b) (McKinney 1998). Under § 220.10, a Class B
Felony conviction carries a minimum sentence of 4 and 1/2 to 9 years with a maximum
sentence of 12 and 1/2 to 25 years' imprisonment. A Class C Felony conviction carries a
minimum sentence of 3 to 6 years with a maximum sentence of 7 and 1/2 to 15 years' imprisonment. A Class D Felony carries a minimum sentence of 2 to 4 years with a maximum sentence of 3 and 1/2 to 7 years' imprisonment. A sentence of parole supervision
may be available for certain D and E Felonies pursuant to Penal Law § 70.06 (3) and CPL
§ 410.91 which were adopted as part of the 1995 Sentencing Reform Act. Under which a
Class E Felony carries a minimum sentence of 1 and 1/2 to 3 years' with a maximum sentence of 2 to 4 years imprisonment.
106 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.10 (McKinney 1998).
107 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.10(2) (McKinney 1998).

108 Interestingly and somewhat illogically, section 70.08, dealing with persistent violent felony offenders, offers a lower minimum range for Class D violent offenses than D
offenders being sentenced under § 70.10. See People v. Velez, 163 Misc.2d 571, 575 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1994) (explaining that New York's Criminal Procedure Law section 70.10 gives
courts discretion to sentence persistent felony offenders from fifteen year to life sentence
if court feels it will serve public interest); Spiros A. Tsimbinos, A Proposed Change in the
Minimum Terms for PersistentNon-Violent Offenders, 13 N.Y. CRIM. L. NEWS 4, 4 (1996)
(calling for reform of section 70.10).
109 See 1973 N.Y. LAWS 196. Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller stated in an Executive
Memorandum that "[tihe crime, muggings, the robberies, the murders associated with
addiction continue to spread a reign of terror." Id.; see also People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d
100, 113 (1975):
Defendants would minimize drug trafficking by arguing that it is not a crime of
violence. Because of their illegal occupation, however, drug traffickers do often commit crimes of violence against law enforcement officers and, because of the high
stakes, engage in crimes of violence among themselves (citations omitted)...
More significant, of course, are the crimes which drug traffickers engender in others. The seller often introduces the future addict to narcotics. The addict, to meet
the seller's price, often turns to crime to "feed" his habit. Narcotics addicts not only
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Under the proposed revisions, drug offenders will face serious consequences for drug fines. Further if their drug use or activities also
lead to violent conduct or if they engage in repeated felony offenses
they will be subject to the most serious consequences of lengthy
mandatory prison terms including the possibility of life imprisonment. These sanctions, however, would be imposed for the offenders violent conduct or repeated conduct where the sentences would
be clearly justified and not for mere drug possession or addiction
where they are not.
If our focus today is on violent crime and recidivism, we can adequately deal with these concerns under current existing law by
properly emphasizing sentence options of isolation and deterrence.
There is no longer any need, however, to impose life sentences for
pure drug crimes in the absence of violence or recidivism and to
claim that this approach is justified as the only was to deal with
the problem. The goal of rehabilitation must again be introduced
as a viable objective of the sentencing process with respect to pure
drug crimes.
CONCLUSION

After twenty-five years of operating under the Rockefeller drug
laws, it is apparent that change and revision are necessary. Sometime within the next few years, under the administration of Governor Pataki, the best possibility may present itself for effectuating
these changes. It is hoped that this article will stimulate a fuller
debate on the issue and that it may offer some thoughts and suggestions which could form the basis for reasonable and meaningful
reform. In this way, criminal conduct involving drug use can be
dealt with firmly and effectively while still maintaining a proper
sense of justice and fairness in the criminal justice system.

account for a sizable percentage of crimes against property; they commit a significant
number of crimes of violence as well.
Faced with what it found to be a high recidivism rate in drug-related crimes, as
inadequate response to less severe punishment, and an insidiously growing drug
abuse problem, the Legislature could reasonably shift the emphasis to other penological purposes, namely, isolation and deterrence."

